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Regulatory Fictions:
On Marriage and Countermarriage
Elizabeth F. Emens∗
Debates about marriage currently capture much public
attention. Scholars have pushed beyond the question of whether gays
are worthy of marriage to ask whether marriage is worthy of gays.
The present moment of questioning marriage in its current form may
be brief. Thus, we should take this opportunity to imagine the widest
possible range of alternatives to our current marriage regime—what
I call countermarriage regimes. This Essay draws on two unlikely
sources of legal innovation to expand our thinking about marriage
alternatives: literature and anti-gay law. Literature offers an array of
countermarriage regimes, including exploding marriage, threestrikes marriage, line marriage, renewable marriage, and
exculpatory marriage. Anti-gay law, if we reimagine it as applying to
everyone, prompts us to consider a world without marriage or indeed
without any contracts between intimate partners. In addition to
opening our minds to countermarriage possibilities, this Essay shows
some overlooked affinities between law and literature, in particular
how both law and literature may serve as unlikely sources of
regulatory innovation.

Copyright © 2011 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
their publications.
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INTRODUCTION
The debates in the public sphere over the future of marriage have spurred
theoretical debates in the academy over the value of marriage. Even as some
scholars debate whether gay people’s relationships are worthy of marriage—
sometimes before large crowds hosted by student organizations—arguably the
most robust theoretical debates have occurred among academics who all fall on
the pro-gay side of the political spectrum.1 Specifically, pro-gay scholars have
engaged in heated exchanges over whether marriage should be the political
goal of LGBT and leftist thinkers. Some of these scholars want to imagine
intimate possibilities apart from marriage, while others think marriage is the
most practical way to organize our intimate lives.2 And several scholars have
1. Indeed, these theoretical debates are so extensive that this brief Essay will make no
attempt to catalogue the relevant work; the texts cited herein are merely exemplary. On
terminology in the Essay, note that by “pro-gay” and “anti-gay,” I mean something like Janet
Halley’s definitions. See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A
Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 503, 516 (1994) (“By anti-gay, I
mean to describe those who believe that homosexuality is bad or harmful and should be punished,
hidden, or restrained; by pro-gay, I refer to those who believe that homosexuality is good or value
neutral and should be celebrated or tolerated.”). I would revise these definitions, for instance, by
replacing “tolerated” with “included,” for reasons well developed in Wendy Brown’s intervening
critique of “tolerance.” See Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of
Identity and Empire (2008). In addition, when applied to laws rather than persons, these terms
refer less to beliefs than to the laws’ effects or to the discourse surrounding their passage.
2. Compare, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual
Family, and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies (1995) (arguing for vertical parent-child
dyads to replace horizontal intimate dyads as the privileged state relationship, and replacing
marriage with contractual arrangements), and Michael Warner, The Trouble with Normal:
Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life (1999) (arguing against the push to same-sex
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identified the current period as a rare window for imagining a space beyond
marriage—a space where intimate relationships previously deemed illegal are
not yet fully embraced by the long regulatory arm of marriage.3
Those who question marriage ask: If marriage urges us to organize our
lives in certain conventional ways, then what might society look like in its
absence?4 For some of these scholars, a world beyond marriage sounds hopeful,
expansive, or at least interesting for its possibilities. This hypothetical world
without marriage stands in sharp contrast to the dim, painful, dignity-deprived
world that is typically represented—strategically, but no doubt truthfully, for
many—by the plaintiffs’ briefs in the same-sex marriage cases.5 In a sense,
then, for the pro-gay scholars who seek to look beyond marriage, the argument
is not over whether gay people are worthy of marriage but, rather, whether
marriage is worthy of gay people—and thus of everyone.6
This Essay imagines a world beyond our current marriage regime by
looking to some unusual sources: fiction and anti-gay law.7 Literature seems
the obvious place to look when we are trying to imagine new possibilities, but
we rarely look to literature as a source for new laws, and we rarely think of law
as a prime site of the imagination. Yet fiction and anti-gay law both occupy
places beyond our usual regulatory imaginings, places of fantasy and fear.
These sources stand outside of—in excess of—our generally applicable laws.8
marriage as a normalizing and exclusive endeavor), and Mary Lyndon Shanley, Afterword, in
Just Marriage 109 (Joshua Cohen & Deborah Chasman eds., 2004) (drawing on essays in this
volume by Cossman, Fineman, Metz, and Brown to conclude that the state should not sponsor
marriage per se but should offer only civil unions), with Carol Sanger, A Case for Civil Marriage,
27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1311 (2006) (expressing skepticism about the ability of a contract law
regime to adequately replace marriage law), and Elizabeth S. Scott, A World Without Marriage,
41 Fam. L.Q. 537, 539, 565–66 (2007) (concluding that, while the choice between expanding
marriage and replacing it with universal civil unions is a “difficult one,” expanding marriage is
probably the better choice), and Mary Lyndon Shanley, Just Marriage: On the Public Importance
of Private Union, in Just Marriage, supra, at 3 (arguing that marriage should be reformed rather
than replaced with a contractarian regime).
3. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 2685 (2008);
Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 277 (2004).
4. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s No Marriage, 16 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 27
(1996); sources cited supra note 2.
5. See, e.g., Final Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 23, Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d
862 (Iowa 2008) (No. 07-1499), 2008 WL 5156764 at *23 (“It is an undisputed fact that
[plaintiffs’] inability to marry their chosen partners is a painful frustration of their life goals and
dreams, their personal happiness and their self-determination.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa
2008) (No. 07-1499) (plaintiffs’ counsel arguing that refusal to extend marriage to same-sex
couples shows “lack of respect and dignity and equality”); Seth Hemmelgarn, Kids Feel the
Impact of Prop 8, Bay Area Rep., Mar. 5, 2009, available at http://ebar.com/news/article.
php?sec=news&article=3770.
6. Cf., e.g., Shanley, Afterword, supra note 2.
7. For an explanation of the term “anti-gay,” see supra note 1.
8. Cf. Adam Phillips, On Balance 2, 9 (2010) (“When people are being extreme they
push things to their limits; when they are being excessive they push things beyond their limits. . . .
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This use of fiction and anti-gay law to imagine new legal regimes adds to
the tools of law and literature as a discipline.9 Law and literature generally
comprises categories such as “law in literature” (think trials in Dickens), “law
as literature” (think deconstructive critique of legal opinions), and “law of
literature” (think copyright law).10 In contrast, by looking to fiction for ideas
for new laws, this Essay engages in an enterprise we might call “literature as
law.” This category bears some relation to the category of law in literature, but,
as I explain below, the aim here is not to study how law operates in literature
—indeed, most of my examples aren’t even real legal regimes within their
fictional worlds—but rather to draw from literature inspiration for novel laws.11
In addition, considering anti-gay laws as a template for legal regimes
evokes the genre of science fiction, in that one strand of science fiction
involves dystopian (or utopian) societies with broadly restricted (or expanded)
individual liberties.12 Thus, the project here of taking laws that specifically
[S]omething as powerful as excess might—if we can suspend our fear—allow us to have thoughts
we have never had before.”).
9. Cf. Robin L. West, The Literary Lawyer, 27 Pac. L.J. 1187, 1187 (1996) (“Surely by
this point—twenty some years into this renaissance [of ‘interest in the various connections
between the fields of “law” and “literature”’]—it now makes some sense to speak of the ‘law and
literature’ movement as a recognizable discipline, or sub-specialty, within both the literature and
legal academies.”).
10. See, e.g., Robert Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise, 1 Yale J.L. & Human. 1, 1
(1988) (defining “law-in-literature” as “involv[ing] the appearance of legal themes or the
depiction of legal actors or processes in fiction or drama” and “law-as-literature” as “involv[ing]
the parsing of such legal texts as statutes, constitutions, judicial opinions, and certain classic
scholarly treatises as if they were literary works”); Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114
Yale L.J. 1835, 1838 (2005) (noting that Weisberg’s two prongs leave out “law-of-literature”
which covers “[t]he legal regulation of literature through obscenity, defamation, and copyright
regimes”); see also Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy
Relationship, 18 Yale J.L. & Human. 155, 182–84 (2006) (noting Weisberg’s categories).
11. Others have used the phrase “literature as law,” though, to my knowledge, differently.
See, e.g., Cynthia G. Hawkins-León, “Literature as Law”: The History of the Insanity Plea & a
Fictional Application Within the Law & Literature Canon, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 381, 385 (1999)
(“review[ing] a particular work of fiction as though it were an actual case file and hypothesiz[ing]
the possible outcome(s) of an imaginary criminal trial”); Desmond Manderson, From Hunger to
Love: Myths of the Source, Interpretation, and Constitution of Law in Children’s Literature, 15
Law & Literature 87, 127 (2003) (discussing Maurice Sendak’s Where the Wild Things Are as
a “story [that] helps form and develop the mental attitudes to law of the children who read it. It
does not just illustrate but inaugurates legal subjectivity. It is law as literature and literature as
law, which is to say, myth . . . .”); Robin L. West, Literature, Culture, and Law - at Duke
University, in Options for Teaching Literature and Law (Austin Sarat et al. eds.)
(forthcoming),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1201867
(comparing the “‘literature as law’ view attributed by [Robert] Ferguson to the Jeffersonian man
of letters,” with Naomi Mezey’s “culture as law” view, both of which see legal sources as part of a
“seamless web of authority with the culture that constitutes it,” though through “high” and “low”
cultural sources, respectively).
12. While recognizing that the distinction between utopian and dystopian fiction depends in
part on one’s subjective ideals, and that the definition of science fiction is contested, we can
nonetheless loosely identify examples of science fiction dystopias, including Margaret
Atwood, The Handmaid’s Tale (1985); Philip K. Dick, The Minority Report (1956); Kurt
Vonnegut, Welcome to the Monkey House (1973), and examples of science fiction utopias,
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target a minority of the population and using them to reimagine universal legal
regimes might be understood as a kind of “law as science fiction.”13
These unusual inquiries yield a variety of intriguing countermarriage
possibilities. By countermarriage, I mean the vast range of alternative ways we
might regulate intimate relationships, from tweaks of existing marriage law (for
instance, assuming marriages automatically expire after a term of years), to
wholesale replacement of marriage with some other regime (for instance,
obligations that attach based on behavior rather than consent).14
I invite the reader into this exploration of countermarriage possibilities for
reasons both general and specific. Generally, this Essay is an exercise in
innovative thinking. Recent work in behavioral science has shown how much
our decisions are determined by the frames surrounding them.15 Thinking along
unusual pathways may help free us from our assumptions so that we may view
the status quo with fresh eyes. Inventing and considering alternatives to current
practice may benefit both our descriptive and our normative analyses across
areas of law. In addition, exploring different types of sources for legal thinking,
such as literature or apparently conservative laws, may give us new tools for
innovation—a topic I revisit in the Conclusion.
More specifically, this Essay urges the reader to think innovatively about
marriage. The fanciful exercises presented here thus complement the thoughtful
work already underway on this subject. As noted above, debating the merits of
marriage as a regulatory apparatus has occupied numerous scholars in recent
years.16 In light of the academic and popular interest in considering marriage’s
aims, functions, and value to society, this seems a critical moment for
sharpening and expanding our thinking in this area. There is work to be done,
including Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Herland (1915); and Robert Heinlein, Stranger in
a Strange Land (1961).
13. As a form of critique, scholars sometimes compare draconian legal and other
institutional regimes to science fiction. See, e.g., Daphne Patai, There Ought to Be a Law, 22 Wm.
Mitchell L. Rev. 491 (1996). Viewing an existing legal regime as like science fiction could also
be called “law as science fiction.” This Essay is unusual, however, in taking a restrictive legal
regime as the starting point for reimagining our broader legal regime. In a sense, then, the
technique in this Essay might be more precisely called “law as science fiction as law,” but that
terminology would be dystopic for aesthetic reasons.
14. I focus principally on sexually intimate relationships here. For thoughtful critiques of
the legal centrality of intimacy so defined, see, for example, Brenda Cossman, Beyond Marriage,
in Just Marriage 93, supra note 2; Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Beyond
Intimacy 2 (Sept. 8, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
15. For foundational work in this field, see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The
Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 Sci. 453 (1981). For discussion of this
field of study in legal contexts, see, for example, Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3
(2006); Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case
for “Asymmetric Paternalism”, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1211 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H.
Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1159 (2003).
16. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 1–4 and infra notes 93–96; Mary Anne Case,
Marriage Licenses, 2004 Lockhart Lecture, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1758, 1792–97 (2005); Elizabeth S.
Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1225 (1998).
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and we want to be sure we are up to the task.
Of course, we may continue to accept marriage in its current form even
after we question our assumptions about it. Considering alternatives to an
institution may lead us to embrace a different approach, or, on the contrary,
such a process may lead us to conclude that the institution has value, perhaps
with greater confidence than if we had remained tied to our assumptions.17 This
Essay offers an array of inventive variations on our current marriage regime to
help free our minds for that evaluative process in the rest of our public and
scholarly discourse. If this moment between gay decriminalization and legal
domestication is already closing—and I am increasingly hopeful that it is—then
we should seize this opportunity to look in any remaining directions for new
ideas and possibilities. We should make the most of this window before it
closes.
Lastly, but not trivially, I hope this experience of engaging the
imagination, of entertaining visions of a world slightly or wildly different from
our own, will be pleasurable. Pleasures vary, of course, and this endeavor will
not be everyone’s idea of fun. Though the hedonic aim of the Essay is not
insignificant to the author, for those readers whose tastes differ I hope the other
aims will be sustaining.
Following this Introduction, Part I of the Essay draws on fictional sources
to canvass some unusual visions of what marriage might be. These include
exploding marriage, three-strikes marriage, line marriage, renewable marriage,
self-marriage, and exculpatory marriage. Part II looks to another unlikely
source for imagining countermarriage possibilities for all: anti-gay laws, in the
form of state Defense of Marriage Acts (“mini-DOMAs”). In particular, this
Part considers a law passed in Virginia in 2004 that expressly forbids
“partnership contract[s] or other arrangement[s]” between “persons of the same
sex” that “purport[] to bestow the privileges or obligations of marriage.”18 This
Part reconceives and extends this restriction, imagining what it might mean
instead to disallow not only marriage but also all contracts for all intimate
partners. After reflecting on these diverse sources, in the Conclusion I offer
some observations on the contributions that literature may make to the project
of legal innovation.
Before beginning, I offer a caveat for the normatively inclined reader: this
Essay explores but does not prescribe. Though discussions of marriage are
typically normative, this Essay resists drawing normative conclusions about
whether we should have marriage and in what form. The aim here is instead to
step away from this prescriptive project and generate a broad range of
17. Cf. Phillips, supra note 8, at 10 (“Perhaps as part of growing up we need to be
excessive—to try to break all the rules just to be able to find out what, if anything, the rules are
made of, and why they matter. Perhaps only the road of excess can teach us when enough is
enough.”).
18. Va. Code Ann. § 20-45.3 (2004).

Emens.FINAL.CORRECTIONS.doc (Do Not Delete)

2011]

REGULATORY FICTIONS

3/10/2011 6:21 PM

241

countermarriage regimes inspired by unlikely sources.
I.
LITERATURE AS LAW
Literature can open up imaginative possibilities. Because it need not
comply with existing laws and social conventions, literature can unsettle our
usual frame of reference and invite us to consider new worlds. Thus, literature
offers a relatively untapped resource for imagining novel legal regimes.19
Building on the typology of “law and literature” categories noted above, we can
think of this endeavor as “literature as law.”20 This Part pursues literature-aslaw possibilities by examining a series of fictional texts that suggest alternative
frameworks to our current marriage law: in other words, countermarriage
regimes. Some of the regimes presented here are set out wholesale in the
relevant literary text; others are extrapolations of an arrangement embedded in
the text. I thus present a selection of fictional possibilities that I hope will be
provocative and perhaps even delightful for their distance from the regimes we
generally consider in our debates over marriage.
A. Exploding Marriage and Three-Strikes Marriage: Playing with Permanence
Goethe’s novel Elective Affinities21 entertains two different
countermarriage regimes that play with the permanence of marriage. A core
aspiration of marriage is that it last forever: Till death do us part. The reality is
of course rather different, with divorce rates for first marriages at 45–50
percent in the United States.22 And while marriage rates have declined, spouses
continue to enter their marriages optimistic about their prospects for staying
together, as reflected in their reluctance to sign prenuptial agreements.23
19. No pun on “novel” is intended here, but it is interesting to note that the term novel
meant, in one historical context, new laws. The fifth definition of novel in the Oxford English
Dictionary is “Roman Law. A new decree or constitution, supplementary to a codex; esp. any of
those enacted by the emperor Justinian. Now hist.” See Oxford English Dictionary Online: novel,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/128757?rskey=eTSpZN&result=1&isAdvanced=false#
(last
visited Mar. 1, 2011) (quoting Gibbon, inter alia, as here: “1788 Gibbon Decline & Fall IV. xliv.
366 The nine collations, the legal standard of modern tribunals, consist of ninety-eight Novels”).
20. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
21. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Elective Affinities, in 11 Goethe: The Collected
Works 89 (David E. Wellbery ed., Judith Ryan trans., Princeton University Press 1995) (1809).
22. Linda A. Jacobsen & Mark Mather, U.S. Economic and Social Trends Since 2000, 65
Pop. Bull., 10 (Feb. 2010).
23. See, e.g., Heather Mahar, Why Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements? 1 (Harvard
Law Sch. John M. Olin Center for Law, Econ. & Bus. Discussion Paper Series 2003), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1224&context=harvard_olin (estimating that only
5–10 percent of couples sign prenuptial agreements). On U.S. marriage rates, see D’Vera Cohn,
The States of Marriage and Divorce, Pew Research Center Social & Demographic Trends
(October 15, 2009), http://pewsocialtrends.org/pubs/746/states-of-marriage-and-divorce (“The
proportion of Americans who are currently married has been diminishing for decades and is lower
than it has been in at least half a century. . . . Among Americans 18 and older, the proportion
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Goethe’s countermarriage regimes play with this assumption of permanence.
Goethe’s first countermarriage idea is what we might call exploding
marriage. In this regime, marriage expires after a fixed term of years.24 The
character of the Count in Elective Affinities explains to an assembled dinner
group that “[o]ne of [his] friends, whose high spirits mostly express themselves
in suggestions for new laws, claimed that every marriage should only be
contracted for a period of five years.”25 Five years, the friend thought “was a
nice odd number, a sacred number, and a period just sufficient to get to know
one another, produce a number of children, separate, and, the nicest part of it,
become reconciled again.”26 In explaining his proposal, the friend would
“exclaim”:
How happily the first years would pass! Two or three years would go
by very pleasantly. Then one party, eager to see the relationship
continue, would become increasingly attentive the closer the end of the
contract approached. The indifferent or even dissatisfied partner
would be charmed and won over. They would forget, as we do the
hours in good company, that time was passing, and would be most
pleasantly surprised to notice, after the deadline was already passed,
that the contract had been extended without a word having ever been
spoken.27
The Count’s friend implicitly critiqued the ways married people sometimes
come to take each other for granted, and cease to invest in the marriage or to
appreciate their spouse. Hence the expiration date. The looming deadline forces
the partners to consider each other closely again, much as one might
energetically consume—or discard—an overlooked item in the refrigerator
upon noticing it expires tomorrow. Interestingly, although the friend’s proposal
seems to imply that the default rule is for the marriage to explode, not continue,
at the five-year mark,28 he also seems to suggest that the couple can opt out of
that presumption and silently ratify their relationship through the behavior of
renewing their enthusiasm for each other and continuing together past the
deadline.29
currently married, but not separated, is 55% for men and 50% for women.”).
24. I thank Martha Nussbaum for directing me to this novel after hearing me talk about
exploding marriage, a concept I think I first heard mentioned by Amy Kapczynski, to whom
thanks are also due.
25. Goethe, supra note 21, at 139.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Default rules are background rules that govern if contracting parties do not contract
around them by opting for another rule. See sources cited supra note 15. For a discussion of the
variability of default rules and their possible uses in marriage law, see Elizabeth F. Emens,
Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev.
761 (2007).
29. Legal analogues include “year-and-a-day marriages, renewable with the consent of the
parties, common among the Irish” and a bill introduced into the Maryland Legislature in 1971
titled “Marriage—Contractual Renewal,” which provided “that a marriage be considered a
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The Count offers another marriage alternative, three-strikes marriage.30
Here, only marriages involving someone who has been married twice before
are legally permanent:
“That same friend,” [the Count] went on, “made yet another suggestion
for a new law: a marriage should only be regarded as indissoluble
when it was the third marriage of one or both. For this was
incontrovertible evidence that marriage was something this person
could not do without. Now it would also be known how they had
behaved in their previous relationships, and whether they had bad
habits, which more frequently lead to separations than do bad
characters. We should find out about one another; and we should keep
an eye on married people as well as unmarried ones, since we could
not know what might come to pass.”
“That would greatly increase society’s interest,” said [another
character]; “for indeed, when we are married, nobody bothers about
our virtues or faults anymore.”31
The suggestion that marriage should be permanent only if at least one party has
been married twice before seems, in a way, perverse. It seems to assume the
impermanence of marriage, at least of first (and second) marriages.32 And it
emphasizes desire for marriage itself—as “something this person could not do
contract for three years with an option to renew for three years, renewable forever, upon mutual
consent thereto.” See Mary Anne Case, A Brief History of Marriage in Anglo-American Law with
Special Reference to those Points of Commonality with the Law of Corporations, 4 n.19
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (citing H.D. 623, Feb. 26, 1971). The law recently
offered a grimmer, mandatory (rather than default) version of exploding marriage to the same-sex
couples married in San Francisco from February 12 to March 11, 2004; later that year, the
California Supreme Court declared those marriages void. Lockyer v. San Francisco, 33 Cal. 4th
1055, 1120 (2004). And a geographical, rather than chronological, version of this might be
extrapolated from the situation of same-sex couples who marry in one of the few states
recognizing same-sex marriage, who then move to a state that refuses to give full faith and credit
to their marriage (as announced by many of the state mini-DOMAs, see infra Part II). A more
voluntary (and playful) version of this hardship could be reimagined as a same-sex couple’s
traveling state to state on their honeymoon, watching their marriage disappear and reappear. (I
thank Suzanne Goldberg for this point.) For those who thought sex was sexier before it was legal,
this kind of vacillating marriage might have a certain appeal. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Supreme
Court Review, Foreword: “You Are Entering a Gay and Lesbian-Free Zone”: On the Radical
Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers, 94 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 503, 527
(2004) (quoting Sarah Schulman).
30. Third-time’s-the-charm marriage might be a warmer name for this one, though harder
to say than three-strikes marriage, which also captures the sense in which this regime takes one
out of the dating game after the third “swing.”
31. Goethe, supra note 21, at 140.
32. A few states have enacted laws that play with the permanence dimension of marriage in
a different way: covenant marriage statutes make entry and exit more difficult for those who opt
into them (which is apparently a very small group). See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-901 to -906
(2010); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-11-801 to -810 (2010); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:272–274, 9:307
(2009); Steven L. Nock et al., Covenant Marriage Turns Five Years Old, 10 Mich. J. Gender &
L. 169, 170 (2003) (estimating that “less than two percent of all newly contracted marriages in
Louisiana are covenant marriages”).
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without”—rather than for the individual partner. And where the Count does
attend to the individual, he focuses on habits rather than character. Such an
account is surprising because a lover is typically expected to adore the essence
of the person. Habit seems superficial, relative to character, though a long
tradition of writers has argued otherwise.33
Both of these countermarriage possibilities resist the usual sentimentality
that presumes some people are meant for each other or even that the heart of
marriage is necessarily love. On the other hand, the two alternatives may be
read to push in opposite directions, with three-strikes marriage focused on a
party’s reaffirming their commitment to the institution time and time again, and
exploding marriage focused on the parties’ reaffirming their commitment to
each other time and time again. By contrast to three-strikes marriage,
exploding marriage might seem highly romantic in its emphasis on the
partners’ affirmative desires, rather than on other values. Thus, both of these
countermarriage possibilities vary our current regime, with one favoring the
institutional over the romantic dimensions of marriage and the other favoring
the reverse.
The novel implies that it is dangerous to question the commonplace
pieties about love, marriage, and permanence. For instance, one character is
quite concerned about exposing a young woman present at the dinner to such
irreverent talk about the sacred institution.34 Moreover, the source of these
marriage variants is a controversial character, someone who has been burned by
marriage in its current form. The Count has been unhappily married for years,
but unable to get out of his unhappy marriage and marry the woman he loves;
he thus spends as much time as he can traveling the country with his beloved,
and is a scandalous, as well as dissatisfied, figure.35 The text thereby creates
some distance from the proposer of countermarriage possibilities by presenting
him as bitter and cynical.36 And yet Goethe also portrays the questioner of
marriage as hopelessly in love, suggesting that his cynicism might be a cover
for his deeply romantic nature. Rather than being the most cynical about love
and relationships, then, the marriage critic might in fact be the most romantic.
This tension—between cynicism and romance, between distance from the
alternatives and engagement with them—gives the reader ample space to

33. For one such argument, and for a history of this vein of thinking, see, for instance,
Elaine Scarry, Thinking in an Emergency (forthcoming 2011) (on file with author).
34. One of their circle, Charlotte, worries over the practice of talking about “criminal or
reprehensible actions as though they were common everyday, or even praiseworthy ones; and
certainly everything pertaining to marriages comes into this category.” Goethe, supra note 21, at
140.
35. See id. at 136. Note that even the Count distances himself from the proposals,
attributing them to a friend. Id. at 139–40.
36. This image of the questioner of marriage as someone who has been burned, by love or
marriage, appears elsewhere in fiction. See, e.g., the discussion of Hamlet, infra note 90, and
accompanying text.
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consider the countermarriage proposals, unencumbered by any clear judgment
from the text. The reader can make what she will of the proposals and of their
various suggestions, taken together, that the institution of marriage may be the
true object of love, or that love may be more important than commitment in
marriage, and that, in either case, a marriage’s structural features may
determine its success or failure.
B. Line Marriage: Reconceiving the Basic Structure
Robert Heinlein’s novel The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress37 offers us the idea
of line marriage. Real-world marriage typically imposes expectations along the
dimensions of numerosity (permitting only two persons per marriage) and
exclusivity (permitting erotic intimacy only within marriage).38 Line marriage
necessarily violates the numerosity requirement, and it may also depart from
the exclusivity requirement:39 in this fanciful marital form, spouses of both
sexes are added to the marriage, one by one, over time. Line marriage bears a
similarity to what we generally think of as polygamy, except that it is
symmetrical and (at least structurally) egalitarian, with multiple spouses of both
sexes.40 It is a “line” in its continuity over time: adding new spouses one after
the other makes it possible that the marriage could continue interminably, like a
corporation.
The form is introduced in the novel by a participant who emphatically
characterizes it as “nice”—a high compliment in his distinctively clipped way
of speaking.41 He says,
Our marriage nearly a hundred years old . . . . —twenty-one links, nine
alive today, never a divorce. Oh, it’s a madhouse when our
descendants and in-laws and kinfolk get together for birthday or
37. Robert A. Heinlein, The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress (Orb ed. 1997) (1966).
38. See Emens, Monogamy’s Law, supra note 3, at 308–09.
39. In principle, line marriage could be either exclusive or open, in that the many spouses
within a particular line marriage could be permitted sexual intimacy only with one another, or
with others outside the marriage as well. As practiced in the novel, spouses apparently permit
sexual contact outside the marriage in a freer way than might be expected in a monogamous
culture, but such contact is sometimes presented as a violation (however minor or accepted) of
some presumed principle of fidelity and sometimes not. Compare, e.g., Heinlein, supra note 37,
at 114 (describing how the narrator’s senior wife housed his new female friend in a room close to
his workshop, “where I slept when slept alone,” in effect telling him, “plain as print”, “‘Go ahead,
dear. Don’t tell me if you wish to be mean about it. Sneak behind my back.’”), with id. at 279
(explaining with bemusement that a new visitor to their moon culture was worried when the
narrator’s wife prepared to kiss him vigorously in greeting after a dangerous journey, because the
visitor was from Earth where marriage “makes a difference” to such behavior and the visitor
therefore foolishly thought the narrator-husband who was standing right there “might take
offense!”).
40. The novel also contains other forms of multi-party marriage; on the moon, where the
novel takes place, the “commonest type” of marriage is a “troika” with two men and a woman
(presumably because of the shortage of women). Id. at 134.
41. The narrator generally avoids articles and otherwise abbreviates his speech, almost as
one might imagine a computer would speak.
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wedding—more kids than seventeen, of course; we don’t count ‘em
after they marry or I’d have ‘children’ old enough to be my
grandfather. Happy way to live, never much pressure. Take me.
Nobody woofs if I stay away a week and don’t phone. Welcome when
I show up. Line marriages rarely have divorces. How could I do
better?42
His interlocutor concurs, “I don’t think you could.”43
Their dialogue further elucidates the variation available within that line
structure. The marriage accommodates new spouses at any time because
“[s]pacing has no rule, just what suits us.”44 And individual families may create
their own patterns, and deviations from those patterns. For example, one family
institutes a requirement to alternate the sex of each new spouse, but treats it
flexibly: “Been alternation up to latest link, last year. We married a girl when
alternation called for boy. But was special.”45 Throughout the book, line
marriage repeatedly engenders praise for its personal and societal virtues,
including “financial security, fine home life it gives children, fact that death of
a spouse, while tragic, could never be tragedy it was in a temporary family,
especially for children—children simply could not be orphaned.”46 Such
analytic praise is underscored by the emotional context in which it is offered—
as in the statement following this list of benefits: “Suppose I waxed too
enthusiastic—but my family is most important thing in my life.”47
Even greater sexual openness characterizes relationships of more than two
elsewhere in Heinlein’s work. In his best-known novel, Stranger in a Strange
Land,48 the characters organize their intimate relationships on a variety of
models, including apparently monogamous pairings. The most significant and
best-loved characters, however, revel in a combination of love and sex with a
range of devoted partners and friends in a communal setting.49
Traditional polygamy, more precisely termed polygyny, in which one man
is married to more than one woman, appears elsewhere in fiction and in fact,
and has been explored in detail by other sources.50 But the line-marriage
structure in particular highlights the possibilities for varying marital structure

42. Id. at 42.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 260. See also id. at 47, 172, 261–62. One of the ways that the inhabitants of Earth
are rendered unsympathetic is through their oppressive response—namely, criminal charges—to
the narrator’s line marriage back on the moon. Id. at 262.
47. Id. at 260.
48. Robert Heinlein, Stranger in a Strange Land (Ace Books 1987) (1961).
49. See id.
50. See, e.g., Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Mormon Question: Polygamy and
Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth-Century America (2002); Raise the Red
Lantern (ERA International et al. 1991); see also Emens, Monogamy’s Law, supra note 3, at
314–17, 332–34 (citing sources).
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along a range of dimensions. Within Heinlein’s imagined universes,
countermarriage possibilities vary the number of partners (numerosity), and the
openness of their relationships (exclusivity), in both structured and unstructured
ways.
C. Who Can Enter: Flipping the Presumptions
In an essay in the Boston Evening Transcript on August 18, 1900,
African-American51 fiction writer Charles Chesnutt imagined a kind of racial
utopia.52 He predicted that “the future American” would be a mixture of the
current races, and he hypothesized a legal regime that would speed us to this
conclusion:
We will assume . . . that the laws of the whole country were as
favorable to . . . amalgamation as the laws of most Southern States are
at present against it; i.e., that it were made a misdemeanor for two
white or two colored persons to marry, so long as it was possible to
obtain a mate of the other race—this would be even more favorable
than the Southern rule, which makes no such exception.53
Even if we erroneously assume two pure races at the start, Chesnutt concluded,
“in three generations the pure whites would be entirely eliminated, and there
would be no perceptible trace of the blacks left.”54
This imagined regulatory regime, akin to one elaborated in slightly
different form by legal scholar Geoffrey Stone a century later,55 flips the
presumption as to who qualifies to enter a marriage. Instead of our historical
legal prescription—and ongoing majority social practice—of racially
homogamous marriage,56 Chesnutt’s law (partially) prescribes racially
heterogamous marriage.
Various works of science fiction alter other conventional expectations of
entrants into marriage, such as the widely held presumption of adult age (by
51. Chesnutt considered himself African-American, as did the one-drop laws of various
jurisdictions, though his paternal grandfather was a white slave owner and he could apparently
pass for white (though he chose not to do so). See, e.g., Pauline Carrington Bouvé, An Aboriginal
Author, Boston Evening Transcript, Aug. 23, 1899, at 16; David Perlmutt, Stamp Honors
Black Author with N.C. Roots, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 7, 2007, at B3.
52. Charles W. Chesnutt, The Future American, Boston Evening Transcript, Aug. 18,
1900, available at http://www.online-literature.com/charles-chesnutt/wife-of-his-youth/11/. I
thank Kevin Maillard for calling my attention to this text.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Commentary, If America Only Had One Mixed Race, Chi.
Trib., Mar. 30, 1999, at 17 (reprinting Stone’s University of Chicago Centennial Contribution)
(setting out a thought experiment, the Mandatory Miscegenation Act of 2100, which provided
that “[n]o person who is not genetically certified as a person of mixed race may procreate with
another person of the same race”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Homogamy refers to pairing within one’s own type. For further discussion, see
Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love,
122 Harv. L. Rev. 1307 (2009).

Emens.FINAL.CORRECTIONS.doc (Do Not Delete)

248

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

3/10/2011 6:21 PM

[Vol. 99:235

making the threshold younger out of necessity in a society decimated by
plague57), or about the sex of the participants (by encouraging, for instance,
same-sex relations to stem population growth in a society facing resource
depletion58). Unlike the science fiction variations on this theme, which tend to
present new presumptions about who should enter marriage in functional terms,
Chesnutt and Stone offer political justifications. In both cases, the fictional
nature of the work provides an opportunity for variations that challenge
assumptions about the entrants to marriage.
Moreover, Chesnutt’s version of this altered reality invokes the criminal
law, making certain kinds of marriages misdemeanors. This is a strong form of
prohibition. Compared with the softer version of a rule presented in Goethe’s
exploding marriage, Chesnutt’s criminal prohibition highlights the ways the
form of the rule can vary—from criminal prohibition of one sort or another, to
civil fines, to regulatory approval, to default rules (creating a presumption,
which parties can overcome by speaking to the contrary), to forced choosing
(requiring parties to choose an option, either of their own design or off a menu),
to framing rules (framing parties’ decisions with particular words or context). A
rich literature on default rules explores the different ways that choices can be
framed—with some of that work specifically applying these tools to the realm
of family law.59 The Chesnutt essay, though far from inventing these sorts of
variations, calls our attention to degrees of regulatory strength through its
invocation of the harshest state regime, criminal prohibition.
D. Renewable Marriage: Buying an Option
Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale60 provides the inspiration for a form of
countermarriage that, generalized, we might call renewable marriage (or
perhaps, more playfully, take-a-break-from-marriage marriage61). This
countermarriage form plays with the permanence, not of the marriage
commitment, but of its termination. Extrapolating from The Winter’s Tale, we
can imagine marriage as a renewable resource: mistreatment by one spouse of
the other leads to a term of years apart, which, if it leads to remorse, can end
with vibrant reunion.
King Leontes, thinking his wife Hermione unfaithful with his friend, and
desperately jealous, jails her, holds a trial in which he disregards the oracle that
declares her innocent, and then orders the murder of their newborn daughter,
Perdita (though she is secretly hidden rather than killed). His actions lead to the
57. See George Stewart, Earth Abides (1949). I thank Alan Fried for pointing me to
Stewart and to Haldeman. See infra note 58.
58. See Joe Haldeman, The Forever War (1974).
59. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 15; Camerer et al., supra note 15; Emens, Changing Name
Changing, supra note 28; Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 15.
60. William Shakespeare, The Winter’s Tale (J.H.P. Pafford ed., Arden 2006).
61. With acknowledgements to Janet Halley’s Split Decisions: How and Why To Take
a Break from Feminism (2008).
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death of their fragile son and the eventual proclamation of Hermione’s death
from grief as well. After sixteen years pass, Perdita is recovered, and
Hermione’s friend Paulina elicits from the remorseful King both an admission
that he effectively killed his wife through his cruelty and a promise that he
would never marry again. The King and Perdita come, with other assembled
guests, to ask Paulina to show them a statue of the Queen in her possession.
Paulina presents the statue to the visitors, and as they admire the likeness,
Paulina promises to bring the Queen back to life: “It is requir’d / You do awake
your faith. Then all stand still: / Or—those that think it is unlawful business / I
am about, let them depart.”62 The King orders Paulina to proceed:
Paul[ina]:
Music, awake her; strike! [Music.]
‘Tis time; descend; be stone no more . . .
Bequeath to death your numnesse; for from him
Dear life redeemes you. You perceive she stirs:
[Hermione comes down.]
Start not: her actions shall be holy as
You hear my spell is lawful. [To Leontes.] Do not shun her,
Until you see her die again; for then
You kill her double: Nay, present your hand:
When she was young you woo’d her; now, in age,
Is she become the suitor?
Leontes:
Oh, she’s warme!
If this be magic, let it be an art
Lawful as eating.63
The play offers language at various points to suggest that Hermione has been in
hiding all these years, cared for by Paulina, but it also leaves open the
possibility that her statue has truly been brought to life.64
Unlike some of our other fictions, which explicitly offer countermarriage
regimes, The Winter’s Tale offers merely a scenario, an anecdote, of renewable
marriage played out between these lovers. The closest we might come to an
affirmative regulatory vision comes in the possible element of magic in the
62. Shakespeare, supra note 60, at 158 (V.iii.94–97).
63. Id. at 159 (V.iii.98–111).
64. Much language pushes toward, but does not definitely determine, the reading of
Hermione as having been hidden rather than conjured. For instance, Leontes notes how her statue
has wrinkles she did not have sixteen years before—which Paulina explains as part of the
sculptor’s talent in rendering her as she would be now. Id. at 155 (V.iii.27–32). The text further
tells us that Paulina has been visiting a remote place, possibly Hermione’s hiding place—“for she
hath privately twice or thrice a day, ever since the death of Hermione, visited that removed
house”—perhaps to care for her. Id. at 151 (V.ii.105–7).
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play: the suggestion that magic might assist the Queen’s return hints at the
possibility of an approving universe—a kind of fictional regulatory body—that
looks on and enables the reunion.
Extrapolated from Shakespeare’s approving frame, the idea of renewable
marriage plays with the presumed continuity of marriage, suggesting that
marriage could be intermittent, or terminated and then resumed.65 It suggests a
structure for the unfolding of relations between lovers over time, after growth
and new appreciation of one for another. One might imagine variations: from
the mistreated spouse who eventually forgives and returns, but only after
remorse and recuperation by the abusive spouse, to the perhaps more fantastical
permanent presumption in favor of a former spouse. Such a permanent
presumption might confer privileges, such as ongoing access to a sexual
relationship, even in the face of separation and reunion—that is, the former
spouse might be an exception to new commitments of exclusivity or
monogamy by the ex.66
A formal legal version of this is even more implausible, though not
impossible. For instance, we might imagine a regime in which relations with a
former spouse would not legally constitute adultery.67 The path of the older
relationship worn into the new one would create a kind of sexual easement that
persists despite new ownership.
This romantic elaboration of renewable marriage reads the play only
through horizontal relations—that is, intimate, as opposed to parental,
65. Of course, at present, marriages can be terminated and then resumed, but this is done
through divorce and remarriage, which follows the usual procedures for any new marriage, rather
than invoking any special practice of renewing the first marriage. In principle, the closest legal
analogue to renewable marriage might be the recent phenomenon that Jeannie Suk has termed
“state-imposed de facto divorce,” in which courts issue restraining orders in domestic violence
situations, thereby prohibiting contact between the parties for a specified period ranging from two
to eight years. See Jeannie Suk, At Home in the Law: How the Domestic Violence
Revolution Is Transforming Privacy 40 n.55, 40–50 (2009). In practice, Suk does not think
that reunion is likely if the parties actually separate for the designated period. See id. at 48. Legal
separation, which does not dissolve the marriage but determines certain legal rights between the
parties, also might be understood as a form of renewable marriage. See, e.g., 27A C.J.S. Divorce §
349 (2010). And as a social matter, people do “renew their vows.” Rachel Emma Silverman, “I
Do, I Do, I Do, I Do” The Serial Vow Renewal, Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 2003, at D1–D15. Where
this is done to repair a rupture in the relationship, rather than to reaffirm a vibrant commitment, it
might be understood as an emotional version of renewed marriage.
66. Think here of popular representations of a partner urging that a sexual dalliance doesn’t
“count” as infidelity because it involves an ex-lover, not a new lover. Of course, the betrayed
lover generally does not see this purported exception the same way. See, e.g., Grace N’ Glamour,
Don at [sic] Justify Your Cheating, Sept. 14, 2009, http://www.gracenglamour.com/dont-justifyyour-cheating/. The emotional, rather than sexual, version of this access may be more accepted.
That is, some kind of emotional closeness among former lovers—at least among great loves—
sometimes persists in one form or another even across subsequent serial monogamy; new lovers
may be more inclined to feel they have to accept this kind of intimacy than physical intimacy.
67. Note that, though largely unenforced, nearly half the states still have adultery laws on
the books. See Gabrielle Viator, Note, The Validity of Criminal Adultery Prohibitions After
Lawrence v. Texas, 39 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 837, 837 (2006).
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relations.68 But The Winter’s Tale does not focus merely, or even principally,
on Hermione’s relation to Leontes.69 Hermione gives us only one reason why
she has returned to life: “to see the issue.”70 Her dead son is gone for good, but
her daughter Perdita has come back (bringing a spouse, who may be read as a
kind of replacement son), and Perdita’s return coincides with Hermione’s.
Perdita’s reunion with Hermione is figured almost romantically. After her
father notes that Perdita “stand[s] like stone with” her mother,71 in essence
taking on her aspect, Perdita speaks to the statue: “Lady, / Dear queen, that
ended when I but began, / Give me that hand of yours to kiss.”72 Perdita’s
words literally describe the gap between them, in that mother and daughter just
missed each other in time, with mother dying just after daughter was born. But
her wording suggests romantic union: one person ends where the other begins.
Perdita’s final and only other line of the scene comes twenty lines before her
mother’s awakening. She sighs: “So long could I / Stand by, a looker-on.”73
The play’s emphasis on the vertical (parental) relation over the horizontal
(intimate) relation may bring us to the more practical reason that spouses
commonly reunite after breaks: to try again for the sake of the children. Even
more, in contrast to the sexual easement I proposed above, the most common
kind of easement a former spouse might have on the other takes the form of the
dialogue, negotiation, and detailed knowledge of each other’s lives necessary to
coordinate their relationships with the children that came from their marriage.74
As noted elsewhere, family constructions in the contemporary United States
look more transgressive when viewed through a child’s eyes: the children of
serial monogamists accumulate multiple parents, creating a kind of structural
polyamory (or polyantipathy) from the child’s perspective.75 Thus, the
renewable marriage possibilities discussed here—while inviting us to
reconsider our expectations about the conditions and terms of exiting

68. Cf. Frances E. Dolan, Dangerous Familiars 168 (1994) (“[Hermione] returns in
order to forgive the father, not particularly for his role in the death of one child and the
abandonment of another but for his jealous, tyrannical treatment of her.”).
69. As Janet Adelman writes, in The Winter’s Tale Shakespeare “opens up a space for the
female narrative—specifically the mother-daughter narrative—his work has thus far suppressed.”
Janet Adelman, Suffocating Mothers 234 (1992).
70. Shakespeare, supra note 60 at 160 (V.iii.121–28). Note the language of possession
Hermione uses toward her daughter, with whom she so looks forward to conversing, evincing her
focus on the future with her daughter. In her relation to Leontes, it is only his closing lines that
emphasize plans for conversation between husband and wife.
71. Id. at 156 (V.iii.41).
72. Id. at 156 (V.iii.42–46).
73. Id. at 158 (V.iii.84–85).
74. We might think of this as a kind of unromantic antidote to Laura Kipnis’s adultery
imaginary, wherein Kipnis says we reinvent ourselves through the violations of normal life
brought on by adultery: the children require a permanent presumption in favor of a former spouse,
which is a constant recurrence of who we were in the past, within the marriage, in terms of shared
obligations. See Laura Kipnis, Adultery, in Intimacy 9, 40–43 (Lauren Berlant ed., 2000).
75. Emens, Monogamy’s Law, supra note 3, at 298.
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marriage—may also be less radical than they at first appear.
E. Solitary Marriage: Isolating and Self-Marriage
Marriage is generally conceived of as a joining together. It thus seems
contrary to, or at least apart from, solitude. But fictional and philosophical
sources—low and high—invite us to consider solitude through marriage.
The poet Rilke, writing in an epistolary mode, urges a view of the good
marriage as a path to solitude:
It is a question in marriage, to my feeling, not of creating a quick
community of spirit by tearing down and destroying all boundaries, but
rather a good marriage is that in which each appoints the other
guardian of his solitude, and shows him this confidence, the greatest in
his power to bestow.76
Rilke eschews the idea of a “togetherness” between people, viewing it as
hindering “freedom and development.”77 But, Rilke concludes,
[O]nce the realization is accepted that even between the closest human
beings infinite distances continue to exist, a wonderful living side by
side can grow up, if they succeed in loving the distance between them
which makes it possible for each to see the other whole and against a
wide sky!78
Rilke’s metaphor of the lovers always appearing to each other against a vast
sky is not a form of structural countermarriage. He embraces our standard
marital form—of two people facing each other and (presumably) only each
other—but his rendition of marriage also imagines each spouse’s role in the
other’s life not as co-entrant into a union but as a protector of the other’s
isolation: as the “guardian of his solitude.”
The relation between marriage and solitude can take a bolder structural
form: marriage to oneself. References to self-marriage appear occasionally in
parodic criticism of same-sex marriage—as another place on the slippery slope
that allegedly runs from same-sex marriage to polygamy.79 In popular fiction,
76. Rainer Maria Rilke, On Love and Other Difficulties 28 (John J.L. Mood trans.,
1975). Rousseau also depicts love as a place for the discovery of a vital solitude: “[D]uring those
few years, loved by a gentle and indulgent woman . . . [t]he taste for solitude and contemplation
grew up in my heart along with the expansive and tender feelings which are best able to nourish
it.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Reveries of a Solitary Walker 154 (Peter France trans., 1979)
(1782).
77. Rilke, supra note 76, at 28 (emphasis omitted).
78. Id. (emphasis in original).
79. For instance, one comment to the news on New Hampshire’s lifting of the ban on samesex marriage wrote:
Marriage is now meaningless in the Granite State. It’s only a matter of time before
other special interest groups argue for their “rights,” and the precedent set here will
allow them to get their way. Want to marry two women? Sure. Ten men. Okay! Want to
marry yourself? Why not, can’t discriminate.
Tom Fahey, Same-Sex Marriage Becomes Law in NH, UnionLeader.com, June 3, 2009,
http://www.unionleader.com/article.aspx?headline=Samesex%2Bmarriage%2Bbecomes%2Blaw
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the idea of marrying oneself is elaborated slightly more seriously in an episode
of the HBO series Sex and the City.80 There, the lead character, Carrie, decides
to announce to a friend that she is marrying herself and registering for a
particular pair of shoes. Carrie’s intention is to make her friend realize how
much Carrie has spent on the friend’s life events, from wedding presents to
baby showers. The friend had insulted Carrie for spending too much on a pair
of Manolo Blahnik shoes that went missing at the friend’s baby shower, where
guests were required to remove their shoes for the health of their toddler. On
learning the shoes were gone, and after some prompting, the friend had offered
to pay for the missing shoes. But when she heard they cost nearly $500, she
reneged, intimating that her own grown-up married life with children leaves no
room for trivial expenditures such as high-end shoes. Carrie fumes as she adds
up how much she has spent on her friend’s life choices—for her engagement
and wedding and babies—expenditures that may never come back to Carrie. So
she decides to leave a voicemail for her friend, announcing her marriage to
herself and her registry at one place: the shoe store Manolo Blahnik. The friend
finally seems to understand Carrie’s point of view and buys the shoes for her,
sending a note saying she hopes that “you and you will be very happy.”
The episode’s flirtation with self-marriage has a serious side: the wealth
transfer from single people to married people that custom often dictates. That
wealth transfer has legal and institutional dimensions, in terms of the state and
workplace benefits that marriage provides to (at least some forms of) married
couples.81 Social status also accompanies marriage, as is often noted in
contemporary marriage debates; for many it signifies, among other things, entry
into stable adult life.82 In this light, that someone might want to marry herself
sounds like less of a joke, if still fanciful.

%2Bin%2BNH&articleId=ac4816e1-7ac9-4694-b89c-b6174c8b6a87 (quoting Alex, Nashua).
80. Sex and the City: A Woman’s Right to Shoes (HBO August 17, 2003).
81. For instance, in the United States, male-female married couples within certain income
ranges receive a federal tax benefit if their income disparity is great enough, but not if their
incomes are similar. See, e.g., Shari Motro, A New “I Do”: Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income
Tax, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 1509 (2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=894104; Alternatives to Marriage Project, Legal and Financial Issues,
http://www.unmarried.org/legal-financial.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2011). Workplaces provide
various kinds of family benefits, the costs of which may be borne at least in part by single (or
childless) colleagues. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie?, 76 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 1753 (2001).
82. See, e.g., Robin Marantz Henig, What Is It About 20-Somethings?, N.Y. Times Mag.,
Aug. 18, 2010, at MM28, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/22/magazine/22Adulthood-t.html.
Moreover, some people might relish the potential for marriage to narrow one’s social world—to
take one “off the market,” as it were.
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F. Exculpatory Marriage: The Ultimate Benefit
Before I discuss Never Let Me Go,83 a warning to the reader: this Section
gives away the twist of this wonderful novel, and can be skipped without
ruining your reading of the rest of the Essay.
In Never Let Me Go, Kazuo Ishiguro, the author of The Remains of the
Day,84 applies his subtle appreciation of human relations to a subject more
typical of science fiction. Ishiguro portrays a dystopic society where the powers
that be have created a race of clones. These clones are kept in institutions so
that eventually their organs may be harvested for the benefit of the regular
citizens. Society exploits some of the clones not only for their bodies but for
their labor: these latter clones act as caregivers for others who, as a result of the
organ harvesting process, are growing gradually weaker on their road to an
early death (or “completion,” as the novel puts it).
The novel’s poignancy turns on two of its features. One is the gradual
unfolding for the narrator, Kathy, of the truth of her own identity as a clone and
of this grotesque societal arrangement; she in turn reveals the rules of her world
to the reader bit by bit. The other is the love between two of the clones—Kathy
and Tommy, a boy with whom she went to “school” before either knew they
were clones—and the rumor that emerges about love as a way out of the early
death to which clones are consigned. As Kathy cares for a childhood friend
before the latter’s completion, the friend reveals the underhanded way in which
she had long ago come between Kathy and Tommy, who had always loved
each other. She urges Kathy to reconnect with Tommy, to pursue their love,
and to seek from the authorities a special dispensation rumored among the
clones.
The rumor is that clones can have their organ donations, and thus their
premature death, “deferred”—“if they’re really in love.”85 Tommy and Kathy
journey to the authorities who had run their school so many years ago. The
lovers plead their case, only to learn that the rumor is false. There is no way to
defer their donations; their love cannot save them. The novel thus beautifully
renders, and then shatters, a classic and deeply human fantasy: that love can
save us from our own mortality.
In so doing, the novel also portrays a fantastical vision of the benefits the
state could bestow on deserving lovers. State-recognized relationships—that is,
what we currently tend to call marriage—can involve any number of statesponsored benefits (and burdens).86 In Ishiguro’s rendering, the state is rumored
to have a regulatory regime that bestows the ultimate benefit on deserving

83.
84.
85.
86.

Kazuo Ishiguro, Never Let Me Go (2005).
Kazuo Ishiguro, The Remains of the Day (1989).
Ishiguro, supra note 83, at 174.
See infra text accompanying note 103.
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couples: life. Those scheduled for execution, for an untimely death by order of
the state, could be pardoned, spared—if their love takes the right form. We
might call this exculpatory marriage. The novel rejects this rumor, but nonetheless leaves us with a striking vision of a state that could select and recognize
only a chosen few for a kind of marriage whose benefit is the right to live.
The possibility of exculpatory marriage drawn from Ishiguro’s world,
though extreme, looks less absurd if we recognize the ways that our current
legal system allows people effectively to “contract around” the criminal law.
For instance, in some states, the (in some ways contractual) relationship of
marriage is a defense to statutory rape.87 (And of course marriage is a defense
to fornication, ex ante if not ex post.) Consent to sex might similarly be
understood, though it sounds crass to many ears, as a form of contract that
converts rape into legal sex.88 Contracting to make pornographic films can
allow one to pay others to have sex without running afoul of prostitution laws.89
The Ishiguro example draws our attention to this feature of existing law and
urges us to imagine the broadest possible range of benefits that marriage law
could confer.
G. The End of Marriage
Following this brief tour of fictional rewritings of our marriage regime, let
us return to Shakespeare for the ultimate countermarriage proposal—Hamlet’s
call for the end of marriage:
Ham. I have heard of your paintings well enough. God hath given you
one face, and you make yourselves another. You jig and amble, and
you [lisp,] you nick-name God’s creatures and make your wantonness
[your] ignorance. Go to, I’ll no more on’t, it hath made me mad. I say
we will have no mo[r]e marriage. Those that are married already (all
but one) shall live, the rest shall keep as they are. To a nunn’ry, go.90
It is hard to read Hamlet’s imagined world without marriage as anything
positive, given its inclusion in his rant against Ophelia. Hamlet’s spiteful
railing against the institution may remind us of Goethe’s Count, whose own
87. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1407 (2010) (“It is a defense to a prosecution
pursuant to § 13-1404 [nonconsensual sexual conduct] or 13-1405 [sexual conduct with minor]
that the person was the spouse of the other person at the time of commission of the act.”).
88. And of course, to other ears, sex always bears an important relation to rape. See, e.g.,
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward A Feminist Theory of the State 128 (1989).
89. See People v. Freeman, 758 P.2d 1128 (Cal. 1988). Freeman doesn’t focus on the
contractual point, but the structure of the arrangement seems to be one in which the parties have
contracted out by agreeing to this third purpose—beyond the purpose of sexual gratification,
which the court focuses on as the thrust of the prostitution statute at issue—of making films. Note
that, beyond sex and marriage contexts, other examples of contracting around the criminal law
include the practice of plea bargaining and laws exempting sports activities from assault laws. See,
e.g., Iowa Code § 708.1 (2010).
90. William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark act 3, sc. 1
(alterations in original but for “mo[r]e”).
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embitterment may be seen to fuel his personal interest in alternatives to
marriage.91 Remember, however, that one of the Count’s variations on
marriage—exploding marriage—might be read as more romantic than cynical,
leaving us with two different versions of what may inspire a turn to marriage
alternatives.92
We need not linger over the basic idea of ending marriage, as it has been
addressed at length in the same-sex marriage debates. Due attention has been
paid to the question whether we should get the state out of marriage altogether
and just permit adults to organize their intimate affairs through private contract
law. Scholars have proposed various rationales for this contractual regime,
including refocusing the state’s attention and resources on relations of
dependency;93 getting the state out of an institution with historical associations
with coverture and other legal impairments for women;94 paving the way for
religions to define marriage more purely according to their faith, rather than
having to accept a compromised version through the state;95 and prompting
partners to make more active choices about the kinds of relationship they want
to have under law as well as the role they want law to play in their
relationship.96 Since this Essay aims to unearth regulatory possibilities that
have not been examined in these debates, I now turn to a source that manages
to push the concept of ending marriage yet another step further: to a world not
only without marriage, as Hamlet envisioned, but also without any contracts
between intimate partners.

91. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
92. Id. Two rather different readings of Hamlet’s world without marriage are also available
from his words: a libertine and a celibate one. “Nunnery” had the contemporary sense of “brothel”
as well as “convent.” See Oxford English Dictionary (draft revision Sept. 2010) (defining
“nunnery” as such and offering the following first example: “1593 Christs Teares 79 b, [To] some
one Gentleman generally acquainted, they giue..free priuiledge thenceforward in theyr Nunnery,
to procure them frequentance.”).
93. This position is most notably associated with Martha Fineman. See Martha
Albertson Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency (2004); Fineman,
supra note 2; see also Nancy D. Polikoff, Ending Marriage As We Know It, 32 Hofstra L. Rev.
201, 204–05 (2004) (criticizing the U.S. focus on narrowly reforming marriage and holding up as
a model alternative the 2001 Law Commission of Canada’s Report: Beyond Conjugality:
Recognizing and Supporting Close Personal Adult Relationships, Dec. 21, 2001, available at
http://www.samesexmarriage.ca/docs/beyond_conjugality.pdf); Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Lesbians
and Gay Men Should Read Martha Fineman, 8 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 167 (1999).
94. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 4 (discussing these and other arguments); Cass R. Sunstein,
The Right to Marry, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 2081 (2005) (same).
95. Cf. Kmiec Proposes End of Legally Recognized Marriage, Catholic News Agency,
May 28, 2009, http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/kmiec_proposes_end_of_legally_
recognized_marriage/; Douglas W. Kmiec & Shelley Ross Saxer, Equality in Substance and in
Name, S.F. Chron., Mar. 2, 2009; cf. also Martha C. Nussbaum, From Disgust to Humanity:
Sexual Orientation & Constitutional Law 163 (2010) (noting, without elaborating, her
support for this approach).
96. See, e.g., Just Marriage, supra note 2 (various essays); David L. Chambers, For the
Best of Friends and for Lovers of All Sorts, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1347 (2001).

Emens.FINAL.CORRECTIONS.doc (Do Not Delete)

2011]

REGULATORY FICTIONS

3/10/2011 6:21 PM

257

II.
LAW AS SCIENCE FICTION
The countermarriage possibilities imagined through fiction took us far
from our current marriage regime in a variety of ways, inventing alternatives to
contemporary practice. Yet, these possibilities all remained forms of marriage.
They largely maintained familiar structures such as consent, duration, and
commitment, while countering our usual expectations of how those features
might work. Even Hamlet’s imagining of the end of marriage was defined
entirely by the familiar form of marriage;97 Hamlet merely posited the absence
of such a thing.
This Section explores a regulatory universe even further afield from
current marriage law.98 The inspiration for this brave new world is, perhaps
ironically, legal rules generated in the name of preserving marriage against the
threat of same-sex relationships: the so-called mini-DOMAs. The miniDOMAs are the Defense of Marriage Act statutes and amendments passed by
many states in recent years to preserve traditional, different-sex marriage
against the perceived threat of same-sex relationships.99 These laws do not
merely declare the absence of marriage for same-sex couples. In their most
extreme form, these laws threaten to ignore certain types of contracts between
same-sex partners. Extrapolating from such laws, we can envision a dramatic
alternative to our marriage regime: a world not only without marriage, but
without any private contracts between intimate partners.
To imagine the possibilities generated by these laws, I use a particularly
sweeping example of a mini-DOMA—a Virginia statute passed in 2004. This
statute is one of many intriguing mini-DOMAs, including others passed in the
state of Virginia.100 But this 2004 Virginia statute is of particular interest
97. Of course, marriage in Hamlet’s time is not an entirely familiar form, in light of the
dramatic changes in marriage over time. See, e.g., Nancy Cott, Public Vows (2000); Case,
Marriage Licenses, supra note 16.
98. Anti-gay law also offers material that could be mined for marriage variations more
akin to those discussed in Part I. For instance, we could draw out a category akin to those above
by looking to cases that find that same-sex relations do not count as adultery. See, e.g., In re
Blanchflower, 834 A.2d 1010, 1011 (N.H. 2003) (holding that sex between two women did not
constitute adultery under New Hampshire’s fault divorce statute, based on the dictionary
definition of “sexual intercourse”). We might (inelegantly) call this asymmetrical gender
exclusivity. A social version of this structure is suggested by the web site
http://www.pornfidelity.com/, in which a married couple has claimed a niche in the porn industry
by inviting others into bed with them, invoking slogans like “The couple that plays together, stays
together,” and yet engaging in sex outside their marriage only with other women. For legal
variations on the exploding marriage theme, see supra note 29.
99. See Andrew Koppelman, The Difference the Mini-DOMAs Make, 38 Loy. U. Chi. L.J.
265 (2007) (explaining the term and the status of these acts, inter alia). Mini-DOMA is the term
coined to describe a state-level version of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), passed in
1996.
100. Virginia first passed a mini-DOMA statute focusing on same-sex marital
relationships:
A marriage between persons of the same sex is prohibited. Any marriage entered into
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because it explicitly targets “partnership contracts.” Setting aside the law’s
discriminatory aspect, I focus instead on what it might mean to treat a law like
this as the starting point for an alternative regulatory regime for everyone. In so
doing, I also show how law opens up imaginative possibilities through what I
call “law as science fiction.”101
Here is the language of the 2004 statute banning, inter alia, same-sex
“partnership contracts”:
Civil unions between persons of same sex. A civil union, partnership
contract or other arrangement between persons of the same sex
purporting to bestow the privileges or obligations of marriage is
prohibited. Any such civil union, partnership contract or other
arrangement entered into by persons of the same sex in another state or
jurisdiction shall be void in all respects in Virginia and any contractual
rights created thereby shall be void and unenforceable.102
The statute is puzzling to say the least. First, what does it cover? What is
included in these words: “partnership contract or other arrangement . . .
purporting to bestow the privileges or obligations of marriage”? Indeed, the
language is so broad that one might ask: What is not included? The scope of the
statute is interesting in its own right, so I will pause over it here.
A. The Scope of the Statute
The “privileges or obligations of marriage” are vast. They include benefits
and burdens directly bestowed by the state and those granted by third parties, as
well as those that partners bestow on one another exclusively or principally.
Though state laws vary, state and federal laws affecting marriage broadly
include tax benefits and burdens for spouses; immigration benefits; evidentiary
privileges; inheritance benefits and obligations; surrogate decision-making
responsibilities; parenting presumptions; special forms of property ownership;
various veterans’ benefits; statutory privileges (such as caretaking leave time
under the Family Medical Leave Act); and a legal mechanism and default rules
by persons of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be void in all respects in
Virginia and any contractual rights created by such marriage shall be void and
unenforceable.
Va. Code Ann. § 20-45.2 (2004). Only a few years later, Virginia passed an expansively worded
constitutional amendment:
[O]nly a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or
recognized by this Commonwealth and its political subdivisions.
This Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal
status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design,
qualities, significance, or effects of marriage. Nor shall this Commonwealth or its
political subdivisions create or recognize another union, partnership, or other legal
status to which is assigned the rights, benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of
marriage.
Va. Const. art. I, § 15-A (2006). My focus in this Essay is a third law passed between the time of
the statute and of the amendment.
101. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text (discussing this term).
102. Va. Code Ann. § 20-45.3.
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for divorce, inter alia.103 Beyond these features created by government,
marriage entails a wide range of privately bestowed benefits and burdens, such
as hospital visitation rights; employment-related health benefits; shared club
membership privileges; presumptively shared names (benefit or burden,
depending on your view); and often public ceremonies (and the costs, gifts, and
status those entail), to name a few. Marriage also comprises various privileges
and obligations that spouses grant each other. These typically include
presumptive or explicit sexual exclusivity; first or high priority for time,
attention, and caretaking in the event of illness; presumptive personal loyalty;
completely or partially shared resources; holiday gifts; shared living space; and
kin work.104 The sheer volume of these marital “privileges or obligations”
makes the scope of the Virginia statute a puzzle.
Who does the Virginia statute prohibit from making what arrangements
under what circumstances? One could speculate endlessly about what the
statute might cover. The statute surely does more than prohibit recognition of
out-of-state same-sex marriages, since Virginia already had a statute
specifically targeting these.105 Beyond that, the statute’s meaning is far from
clear.106 Here are a few possible readings. As I will discuss, the statute invites
us to think beyond the end of marriage and imagine countermarriage regimes
for all relationships.

103. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955–56 (Mass. 2003);
Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 129 (2003); David L.
Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and
Gay Male Couples, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 447 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, The Right To Marry, 26
Cardozo L. Rev. 2081 (2005).
104. Most of these are neither necessary nor unique to marriage, but most are arguably
typical. For more on kin work, see Micaela di Leonardo, The Female World of Cards and
Holidays: Women, Families and the Work of Kinship, 12:3 Signs 440, 442 (1987) (coining the
term “kin work,” which refers to “the conception, maintenance, and ritual celebration of crosshousehold kin ties . . . ”).
105. See supra note 100.
106. Virginia courts have offered some limited interpretation of the statute thus far. In
Stroud v. Stroud, 641 S.E.2d 142 (Va. Ct. App. 2007), a court of appeals held that the two
Virginia statutes cited above bore no relevance to its decision to terminate an ex-wife’s alimony
upon her cohabitation with another woman. Pursuant to a divorce property settlement agreement,
the wife’s alimony would be terminated upon “the remarriage of Wife and/or her cohabitation
with any person to whom she is not related by blood or marriage in a situation analogous to
marriage for a period of thirty (30) or more continuous days.” Id. at 145 (emphasis in original). In
addition, the Attorney General issued an opinion letter when Virginia was considering its miniDOMA constitutional amendment in 2006, quoted supra note 100, offering a narrow
interpretation of existing law along with the pending amendment. The Attorney General
essentially read these laws not to interfere with basic contractual and other rights that were not
unique to marriage—in other words, he read these mini-DOMAs narrowly to apply only to rights
unique to marriage. Opinion Letter from Attorney General Robert F. McDonnell to the Honorable
Stephen D. Newman et al., No. 06-003, 2006 WL 4286442 (2006). As the court pointed out in
Stroud, opinion letters by the Attorney General are not binding on the courts. 641 S.E.2d at 151.
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1) State-created civil unions only. The statute might be read to refer only
to official civil unions formed in other states. At first glance, this reading looks
promising. For instance, the title of the statute—“Civil unions between persons
of same sex”—supports this interpretation by mentioning only civil unions.
And while we can assume that the words “partnership contract or other
arrangement” following “civil union” were significant to the legislature—since
it rejected the governor’s proposal to remove those words107—the purpose of
those words could merely be to make sure the statute covers any civil-uniontype status that another state might create, whatever the name.
But there are features of the statute that cut against this reading. For
instance, there is a superfluity problem if the statute refers only to other states’
statuses, since the second sentence of the statute expressly concerns unions
from other jurisdictions. Moreover, both the version of the statute first
introduced in the House and the amended version the House initially passed
contained only language about unions and contracts created in other
jurisdictions.108 Late in the amending process, the Senate Committee for Courts
of Justice incorporated the first sentence of the final statute.109 In light of the
107. HB 751 Governor’s Recommendation, Virginia Bill Tracking - 2004 Session,
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?041+amd+HB751AG.
108. The main sponsor of the bill, Representative Marshall, initially put forward two
versions of the bill: H.B. 750 (which Marshall proposed alone and which contained an additional
line declaring a state of emergency), and H.B. 751 (which lacked the state of emergency language
and which several other representatives joined). See H.B. 750, 2004 H. Dels., 2004 Sess. (Va.
2004), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?041+sum+HB750 (legislative summary for H.B.
750); H.B. 751, 2004 H. Dels., 2004 Sess. (Va. 2004), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgibin/legp504.exe?041+sum+HB751 (legislative summary for H.B. 751) [hereinafter H.B. 751
Summary]. H.B. 751 eventually underwent revisions and became the final statute. H.B. 751
Summary. The language of H.B. 751, as originally proposed, was as follows:
The General Assembly hereby concludes that the Commonwealth of Virginia is under
no constitutional or legal obligation to recognize a marriage, civil union, partnership
contract or other arrangement purporting to bestow any of the privileges or obligations
of marriage under the laws of another state or territory of the United States unless such
marriage conforms to the laws of this Commonwealth.
H.B. 751, 2004 H. Dels., 2004 Sess. (Va. 2004), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/
legp504.exe?041+ful+HB751 [hereinafter H.B. 751 Proposed].The additional line in Marshall’s
alternative and ill-fated version read: “That an emergency exists and this act is in force from its
passage.” H.B. 750, 2004 H. Dels., 2004 Sess. (Va. 2004), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/
legp504.exe?041+ful+HB750. The version that the House passed, amended by the House
Committee for Courts of Justice on Feb. 6, 2004, reads:
The General Assembly declares as its existing public policy that the Commonwealth of
Virginia does not recognize a marriage, civil union, partnership contract, or other
arrangement purporting to bestow the privileges or obligations of marriage under the
laws of another state or territory of the United States unless such marriage conforms to
the provisions of Chapter 2 of Title 20 (§§ 20-13 et seq.).
H.B. 751, 2004 H. Dels., 2004 Sess. (Va. 2004), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/
legp504.exe?041+ful+HB751H1. Finally, on March 8, 2004, the Senate Committee for Courts of
Justice proposed the amended version of the statute that incorporated the language that was finally
enacted. H.B. 751, 2004 H. Dels., 2004 Sess. (Va. 2004), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/
legp504.exe?041+ful+HB751S1.
109. H.B. 751, 2004 H. Dels., 2004 Sess. (Va. 2004), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/
legp504.exe?041+ful+HB751 (“Whereas, persons who wish to dispose of their property or assign
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statutory superfluity point, and the timing of the introduction of that first
sentence, the statute seems to target something broader than merely out-of-state
civil unions.
2) All of marriage. Perhaps the statute narrowly covers only those
agreements that include all of the rights and obligations of marriage that
private contract can confer, that is, those agreements that attempt to replicate
marriage as closely as possibly through private contract. This reading would
seem consistent with the idea of trying to prevent harm to the institution of
marriage by preventing attempts to copy it. It also has the advantage that a
court could probably determine from the four corners of an agreement whether
the statute covered it. The difficulty with this reading, however, is the statute’s
reference to the “privileges or obligations” of marriage, rather than the
privileges and obligations. Because an exact copy of marriage would include
both privileges and obligations, rather than one or the other, this reading strains
against the statutory language.
3) Platonic relationships. The statute might, in principle, disregard
romantic involvement. On its face the statute says nothing about homosexuality
or romantic relationships. Could the statute apply to a partnership agreement
between two male doctors that creates a joint medical practice and conveys the
practice to the survivor if one of the partners dies? This borders on the absurd.
The legislative history110 makes plain that the statute’s concern is
homosexuality. Presumably, only a judge wishing to gain popular support for
striking the statute down would read the statute this way (though, interestingly,
it might also help the statute escape Romer-type problems).111
4) Speaking “marriage.” Perhaps the word “marriage” matters. Maybe a
court could sort those arrangements that purport to bestow the relevant
privileges or obligations from those that don’t by looking to whether the word
“marriage” appears in the agreement. This might seem unduly formalistic, but,
like the “all of marriage” reading above, it would simplify coverage
determinations. Of course this would also probably mean a great deal of
overbreadth (since “marriage” has meanings beyond romantic marriage112) and
the power of attorney to another person in case they are sick or disabled are legally authorized to
do so at present without regard to any legal impediment or qualification regarding their sexual
orientation.”).
This aspect of the process helps to make sense of the fact that the only document in the
legislative history—a proposers’ preamble (an otherwise unheard-of type of legislative document
in Virginia, according to librarians at University of Virginia, the VA State Law Library, and the
Virginia Assembly, as reported to Beth Williams, librarian at Columbia Law School)—speaks
only of the civil unions of other states and even asserts that same-sex couples can obtain
enforcement of private agreements just like anyone else.
110. See sources cited supra note 108.
111. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see infra note 116.
112. For example, what if our platonic male doctor friends discussed above used the word
“marriage” in their contract to convey the closeness of their business relationship (perhaps one of
them was an avid reader of the OED)? Presumably, under this reading the statute would reach
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underbreadth (since the M-word might not be used in romantic situations for
any number of reasons).113
5) Contextualized overlap with marriage. That we can speak of
overbreadth and underbreadth suggests we have some idea of the core of the
statute. The context—the relationship of the parties, most importantly, and
probably their intent in entering the agreement—would seem to matter. The
public nature of their relationship and any associated ceremony might be
sufficient (but not necessary) to bring any contracts they formed within the
statute’s scope. And so, in addition to applying to civil unions from other
jurisdictions, the statute would apply to any arrangement between romantically
involved same-sex partners that concerned most or many of the key privileges
or obligations of marriage. And more broadly, the statute might well mean
nonenforcement of any individual agreement between same-sex partners that
overlaps with a specific privilege or obligation of marriage.114 This might also
reach any third-party agreement that benefitted them, such as a healthinsurance policy covering same-sex partners.115
6) Any agreement between same-sex intimate partners. Which of the
above interpretations a judge would choose could plausibly depend on whether
the judge wanted to uphold or strike down the statute, or, otherwise, how the
judge sought to resolve the dispute at hand.116 But in light of the previous
them.
113. For instance, the statute wouldn’t affect two women in a long-term sexual partnership
who make an agreement tracking marriage law as closely as possible—in order to try to get
around the fact that marriage itself is unavailable to them—if they chose not to use the M-word,
for instance, because of simple omission, an attempt to evade the statute, or a wish not to be
associated with the institution of marriage for feminist or other reasons). Cf. Paula Ettelbrick,
Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, Out/Look Nat'l Lesbian & Gay Q., Fall 1989,
at 14.
114. Related to this, a court that thinks the aim of the statute is to get at bundlings of
privileges and obligations might still think that any agreement covering just one such privilege or
obligation could be an effort to end-run the statute by building up such a bundling gradually.
115. This is even setting aside the question whether “prohibited” might mean something
more than legal but not enforceable—for instance, criminal. Cf. Martha A. Field, Surrogate
Motherhood: The Legal and Human Issues (1990) (arguing for a treatment of surrogacy
contracts as legal but unenforceable). Note, though, that the second sentence of the statute refers
to other jurisdictions’ contracts being “void” whereas the language in the first sentence is
“prohibited,” suggesting that “prohibited” in the first sentence was chosen carefully and has some
meaning distinct from “void.” The language of prohibited rather than void might seem to imply
the criminalization of such contracts—much like for prostitution or conspiracy agreements (or in
some places, surrogacy agreements). But without any express mention of the criminal law and any
penalties, this seems a stretch.
116. Plausible grounds for striking down the statute would include equal protection via
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). The broader the scope of the statute, the harder it becomes
to say that the statute’s sole purpose is to protect the traditional meaning of marriage rather than
to single out lesbians and gays for special legal burdens (to the extent that that distinction holds at
all). The statute is presumably prospective, not retrospective, but if it were read as the latter, it
would presumably violate the Contracts clause. Cf. Douglas W. Kmiec & John O. McGinnis, The
Contract Clause: A Return to the Original Understanding, 14 Hastings Const. L.Q. 525 (1987);
see also supra note 106 (discussing limited interpretation of the statute thus far).
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interpretation offered, anyone in a same-sex romantic relationship could
understandably be concerned that in the context of his relationship, any contract
with his partner might not hold up in court.117
This final possibility brings us to a very different kind of inquiry.
B. Freedom for All: Applying a Broad Reading Broadly
One thing (and perhaps only one thing) is clear from the Virginia statute:
it covers only persons of the same sex. A man and a woman together doing any
of the things potentially proscribed by the statute fall outside its purview. But
what if that weren’t so? What if the statute applied to everyone?
A generalized version of the statute invites us to imagine a starkly
different legal regime.118 It suggests the possibility of a world in which any
contract (whether a partnership contract or otherwise) between intimate
partners (whether same-sex or opposite-sex) is void and unenforceable.
Taking the Virginia statute’s first sentence as our focus, we can imagine a
generalized version:
A civil union, contract, or other arrangement purporting to bestow the
privileges or obligations of marriage is prohibited.
The world of the revised statute could take either of two forms. In one version,
all other laws would stay as they are, so marriage would remain in place, and
the only difference from our current world would be that no romantically
involved couples, either straight or gay, could create enforceable contracts that
overlap with marriage’s privileges or obligations. Such a regime might comport
with the state’s interest in promoting traditional marriage and in preventing
alternative arrangements from “weakening the institution of marriage which is
foundational to this country’s history and tradition.”119 But the second version
of this alternative legal regime is more interesting.
Under the second imagined regime, there would not only be no marriage,
there would be no enforceable contracts between intimate partners. I am not
advocating such a world, nor am I predicting it as in any way a plausible
eventuality.120 In this imagined world, though, people in romantic relationships
117. Of course, contracts—express or implied—that trade in sex are generally not
enforceable. But even Hewitt, which feared that enforcing a cohabitant agreement would diminish
the institution of marriage, recognized that “cohabitation by the parties may not prevent them from
forming valid contracts about independent matters, for which . . . sexual matters do not form any
part of the consideration.” Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1208 (Ill. 1979). What I am
discussing here, by contrast, are contracts that do not have sex as any part of the consideration—
such as contracts concerning a business partnership—but that, hypothetically, might nonetheless
be invalidated simply because the parties are sexually involved.
118. Such a version would also narrow the range of possible constitutional objections to the
statute. Cf. supra note 116.
119. H.B. 751 Proposed, supra note 108.
120. Thus, I do not attempt to define the precise contours of such regime, such as how the
state would define and prove romantic relationships for these purposes, or how legal relations to
children would be determined. Note, though, that this hypothetical regime has historical
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would not be able to marry or to form any legally enforceable agreements with
each other.
Although this might seem absurd, it is possible to generate reasons for
refusing to enforce contracts between romantic partners, regardless of how
unlikely such a refusal is. First, the state might be concerned about bounded
rationality among contracting partners.121 That is, a state might plausibly think
that romantic partners are peculiarly bad at making sensible contracting
decisions. Such partners may be overly optimistic about the future, as people on
the verge of marriage tend to be. As Pollock and Maitland famously said, “[o]f
all people in the world lovers are the least likely to distinguish precisely
between the present and the future tenses.”122 They therefore may create
contracts that do not properly assess risks and eventualities. Optimism and
cloudy thinking may override the cautionary function of legal formalities.123
An inability to make rational, independent decisions underpins some
standard reasons that we decline to enforce otherwise valid contracts. Think
here of duress, undue influence, or even incapacity. We might think of lovers as
like those whose will is overborne, or like drunk people or children, in their
relations with each other.
Second, the state might be unwilling to hold lovers to their contractual
obligations because of paternalistic concerns. As with infancy or mental
incapacity, we may worry that inequality in the relationship will produce terms
more favorable to one party in a way that is substantively unfair.124 We thus
free our most vulnerable citizens from obligations they may unwittingly incur.
Of course, to stretch this concern about vulnerability into a refusal to enforce
any such contracts seems excessive. But the aim here is to entertain unusual
possibilities, not to devise an ideal regime.
Third, if the parties aren’t making rational decisions, then their
agreements may be less likely to have the features that lead us, under a welfare
analogues, for instance, in the situation of mixed-race couples in states with antimiscegenation
laws before Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal.
1976). On Marvin, see infra note 137.
121. Brian H. Bix, Choice of Law and Marriage: A Proposal, 36 Fam. L.Q. 255, 270
(2002) (defining bounded rationality as “people’s natural inability to calculate rationally or
effectively about certain matters” and observing that “[t]here is some argument that the problem
of bounded rationality might be particularly important for parties’ bargaining about marriage”);
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 Stan. L. Rev.
211, 254–58 (1995) (arguing, on the basis of bounded rationality concerns, that courts should
evaluate prenuptial agreements for “whether, in light of all relevant factors, the parties were likely
to have had a mature understanding that the agreement would apply even in the kind of marriage
scenario that actually occurred”).
122. 2 Sir Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, The History of
English Law Before the Time of Edward I 368–69 (photo. reprint 1968) (2d ed. 1898).
123. Cf. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799 (1941).
124. These were of course among the reasons adduced for not enforcing prenuptial
agreements, in addition to the problem that they contemplated the end of marriage. See, e.g.,
Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990).
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rationale, to enforce contracts.125 That is, the parties, by not pursuing their
individual self-interest, may not achieve a surplus; the contract they create may
not be Pareto optimal.126 Classic contracting parties are those who stand “at
arm’s length.” Where the parties’ judgment is boundedly rational to the extent
of lovers’, then their contracts may simply be less likely to be welfarepromoting. If so, why would the state waste resources enforcing such
agreements?127
Related to this welfare rationale for non-enforcement is a separate
concern: enhanced enforcement costs. The state might prefer not to enforce
contracts between lovers in order to avoid the costs to the state of such
enforcement.128 Contracts formed between lovers could disproportionately
result in litigation costs. Picture two sets of contracting parties: AB and CD.
Each set creates a business partnership. The only difference between them is
that A and B are romantically involved while C and D are not. Which venture
seems more likely to fail? The state might plausibly predict AB. In addition, a
state might well predict that even if both AB and CD fail, then AB is more
likely to end up in litigation. To paraphrase Bob Ellickson, the conflicts that
end up in court, and thus in casebooks, disproportionately involve “sociopaths
and love triangles.”129 For any number of paternalistic or cost-based reasons,
then, a state might prefer not to enforce contracts between lovers.
This alternative world seems obviously implausible, or even impossible.
A world where lovers can neither marry nor contract sounds ludicrous—the
mad musings of a legal scholar gone awry. But this scheme is not too far
removed from the world contemplated for same-sex couples in Virginia. The
state of Virginia thus imaginatively forces us all into this alternative legal
world—the world of no marriage and no contracts.

125. For a thumbnail sketch of a welfare rationale for contract enforcement, see Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 1102 (2001) (“From
the perspective of welfare economics, the purpose of contracts is to promote the well-being of the
contracting parties . . . .”).
126. “[A] transaction is Pareto optimal if it makes at least one person better off and no one
worse off.” Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. Legal Stud.
103, 114 (1979).
127. There are many plausible responses to this question, and many alternative theories of
contract enforcement; I mean here only to adumbrate some arguments that might be mustered in
favor of the seemingly ludicrous no-contracts/no-marriage regime.
128. Cf. Examining the Work of State Courts, National Center for State Courts,
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2007B_files/civil.pdf (2007) (reporting that contracts
cases have increased sharply and that “[m]any states are struggling to clear their civil caseloads,
possibly as a result of . . . tightening resources”).
129. See Emens, Intimate Discrimination, supra note 56, at 1384 (quoting exchange with
Ellickson and explaining context).
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C. Obligations for All: Conduct over Consent
In a world without marriage or contract, would intimate partners
necessarily have no legal obligations to one another? That is one way to
imagine the regime I have been discussing, a regime we might call the “NoContract–No-Marriage” world.
Another way to picture our No-Contract–No-Marriage world is as one that
lacks only those obligations based specifically on consent—consent to marriage
or consent to contract. In the United States, marriage, like contract, typically
relies upon a crucial moment of intent: the spoken “I do.”130 But the state need
not require an isolated moment of explicit intention before assigning
obligations to parties. Indeed, most of our law operates without any such
requirement; think of tort law, criminal law, and administrative law. A regime
without consent-based obligations between intimate partners could still involve
legal obligations. The regulatory apparatus would merely impose them in other
ways, or on some other principle besides consent. Such obligations are
ascriptive—they are ascribed rather than affirmatively undertaken.
A quasi-legal text gives us a jumping-off point for imagining such
obligations—though it does so assuming a backdrop of both marriage and
contract. This text is the American Law Institute (“ALI”) Principles of the Law
of Family Dissolution.131 The ALI suggests imposing support obligations
between intimate partners after just two to three years of cohabitation.132 If two
people live together as a couple for this period, then (subject to various
exceptions and variations) the ALI urges that states treat them the same as
married partners in terms of property distribution and alimony upon divorce.133
Note that the ALI’s domestic partnership regime is not the same as common
law marriage because it concerns only those obligations arising after, not
during, the relationship, and concerns only obligations between partners,
without assigning any obligations to the state or other third parties.

130. I say “typically” because eleven states and the District of Columbia still allow the
formation of new common law marriages. See Utah Code Ann. 30-1-4.5 (2008); Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. § 2.401 (2007) (calling it “informal marriage’); Coleman v. United States, 948 A.2d
534, 544 (D.C. 2008); In re Marriage of Martin, 681 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Iowa 2004); Snetsinger v.
Montana University System, 104 P.3d 445, 451 (Mont. 2004); DeMelo v. Zompa, 844 A.2d
174,177 (R.I. 2004); Standefer v. Standefer, 26 P.3d 104, 107 (Okla. 2001); In the Matter of the
Petition of Lola Pace, 989 P.2d 297, 297 (Kan. 1999); People v. Lucero, 747 P.2d 660, 663 (Colo.
1987); Tarnowski v. Lieberman, 560 S.E.2d 438, 440 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002); Walker v. Walker,
567 So.2d 869, 869 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); see also N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:39 (2009)
(recognizing common law marriages only after the death of one partner).
131. Amer. L. Inst., Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and
Recommendations (2002) [hereinafter Principles].
132. Id. § 6.03, cmt. d.
133. See id. § 6.03 cmt. b.
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Domestic partnership under the ALI is based on behavior and reliance,
rather than on the contractual moment of intent.134 As presented in the
Principles, however, the ALI regime does incorporate ideas of contractual
intent in two main ways. First, the ALI proposes the domestic partnership
regime as a set of default rules, which the parties can avoid by expressly
indicating their intent either to not assume such obligations or to assume other
obligations. Second, the ALI envisions the domestic partnership regime as a
supplement to a marital regime, so the contract-like moment of promising (to
marry) is also recognized under the actual ALI regime.
A small revision to the ALI regime yields yet another possibility: our
imagined No-Contract–No-Marriage regime could abandon the assumed
background of our consent regimes. In its wake, picture the ALI’s ascriptive
domestic partnership regime, but without marriage of the “I do” variety or
contracts between intimates. This revised ALI regime draws on our reimagined
Virginia statute to envision a truly different regulatory universe.
The reasons discussed earlier for (hypothetically) questioning the
advisability of enforcing contracts between intimates—bounded rationality,
protection of a weaker party, inadequate benefits to the parties, costs to the
state—could also support obligations assumed through behavior and reliance
rather than affirmative consent. That is, ascribing obligations could be
appealing because people in intimate relationships may be boundedly rational
and thus unrealistic about what the future holds and what they might need to do
to protect themselves; because women, more than men, may become
economically dependent through their intimate relationships; because welldesigned background rules (if we assume or strive for them to be so) may be
welfare-promoting in ways that such parties’ contracts might not be; and
because the end of such relationships may lead some (most often women and
children) to be dependent on the state.135 Thus, the same rationales that could
support the refusal to recognize romantic parties’ spoken commitments to one
another could nonetheless be invoked to recognize some obligations—those
obligations created through behavior rather than words. Once again, we see that
seemingly outlandish proposals warrant consideration because they intersect
with the values of existing institutions.
134. The ALI Principles approach has been the subject of extensive debate, which I do not
even attempt to catalogue in this short Essay. By way of example, see Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract
Thinking” Was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1365 (2001); Nancy D. Polikoff,
Making Marriage Matter Less: The ALI Domestic Partner Principles Are One Step in the Right
Direction, 2004 U. Chi. Legal F. 353 (2004); Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation, and
Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 2004 U. Chi. Legal F. 225 (2004).
135. See, e.g., Theresa Glennon, Still Partners? Examining the Consequences of Postdissolution Parenting, 41 Fam. L.Q. 105, 110–11 (2007) (“Current approaches to the financial
dissolution of marriages leave women and children in their care experiencing, on average, a thirty
percent decline in their standard of living after a divorce.”); Linda C. McClain, “Irresponsible”
Reproduction, 47 Hastings L.J. 339, 355–56 (1996) (noting that “divorce or marital separation is
the most common precipitating factor which leads women to seek [AFDC] benefits”).
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D. A Range of Alternatives: From Consent to Conduct and Back
This is not to say that an ascriptive regime of this sort is actually
preferable to consent-based regimes such as contract or marriage. But as part of
this exploratory exercise, we do well to consider the range of alternatives.
Table I thus presents a summary of several of the imaginative possibilities
inspired by the Virginia mini-DOMA and the ALI Principles regimes together.
Table I: Countermarriage Possibilities from No-Contract and
Ascriptive Regimes

Behavior
sufficient to
create
objections

Behavior not
sufficient to
create
objections

Consent sufficient to create
obligations
I: ALI regime
• marriage and contract
alongside ascriptive
domestic partnership
regime
III: Current regime (for those
eligible for marriage)
• marriage
• contractual alternatives
• few ascriptive obligations

Consent not sufficient to
create obligations
II: No-Contract–NoMarriage world plus revised
ALI regime
• no marriage
• no contract
• ascriptive obligations
IV: No-Contract–NoMarriage world
• no marriage
• no contractual alternatives
• no ascriptive obligations

The table brings together the different regimes outlined in this Part. It
shows us the version that is closest to our current regime (Box III) for those
people eligible for marriage. This includes the availability of both marriage and
contract,136 but few ascriptive obligations in the absence of consent.
The table also shows us three alternative worlds. The actual ALI regime
(Box I) retains marriage and contract and adds some ascriptive obligations for
those who do not create consent-based obligations but behave in ways that
trigger the ALI regime. The aim here, as the ALI indicates, is to protect
vulnerable parties in serious but not formalized relationships by creating a
regime for sorting out the breakdown of their relationships.137 The regime in
this box could also go beyond what the ALI envisions and entail a broader
range of obligations—including obligations between partners while still
together. Such a regime might be compared to the common-law marriage

136. It might be more accurate to say “either marriage or contract,” as the ability to marry
and contract about the inner workings of marriage (as opposed to the terms of dissolution) is
relatively limited.
137. Marvin doctrine is sometimes used to this effect, even without an explicit oral
agreement. See Ellman, supra note 134, at 1365 (summarizing Marvin doctrine).
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regimes still extant in several states, although such regimes typically require
some form of consent.138
The No-Contract–No-Marriage world (Box IV) repudiates obligations
between intimate partners altogether. Here there are neither consent-based
obligations (marriage or contract) nor ascriptive obligations (like those the ALI
proposes). This is the world we envisioned by universalizing the broadest
reading of Virginia’s mini-DOMA. Intimacy in this world is deemed
incompatible with legal commitments.
Finally, the regime that is perhaps furthest from our own (Box II) brings
our variation on the ascriptive ALI Principles together with the No-Contract–
No-Marriage regime we derived from Virginia’s mini-DOMA. This regime
ascribes obligations based on behavior, and does not enforce obligations
undertaken by consent—whether piecemeal through contract or wholesale
through marriage. This regime moves farthest away from our usual respect for
consent through contractual or marital commitment.
***
Across our legal and literary sources, we have seen countermarriage
regimes that depart from our current regimes along many axes, including the
conditions of entry (whether based on consent or behavior), the participants
(who gets in and with what structure), the benefits and burdens (from financial
obligations to a reprieve from death), the dimension of time (in terms of
continuity and permanence), the conditions of exit (how it is effected and
whether any rights persist), and the form of the legal rule (from criminal
prohibition to default presumption to forced choosing). These regimes are not
proposals for improvements on our current regime. They are exercises to push
our minds through a range of alternatives, and to lead us to see the kinds of
possibilities that might exist.

CONCLUSION: OF LAW, LITERATURE, AND INNOVATION
Marriage is the triumph of imagination over intelligence.
Second marriage is the triumph of hope over experience.139
These lines, often mistakenly attributed to Oscar Wilde, present ordinary
marriage as an imaginative endeavor. It may be so, at least for some. And it is
138. On common-law marriage, see note 130.
139. This popular phrase has variously been attributed to diverse sources, including Oscar
Wilde. The attribution appears to be apocryphal, and the phrase a paraphrase and amalgamation of
separate witticisms by Samuel Johnson and H.L. Mencken. See Boswell, 1 Life of Samuel
Johnson 376 (Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons 1907) (entry for 1770) (“A gentleman who had been very
unhappy in marriage, married immediately after his wife died: Johnson said it was the triumph of
hope over experience.”); H.L. Mencken & George Jean Nathan, Heliogabalus 131 (Knopf
1920) (“She was complaining that love was beyond her comprehension—that it was ineffable,
indescribable, transcendental. ‘Love,’ I replied, with droll perspicacity, ‘Love,’ I replied, ‘is the
triumph of imagination over intelligence.’”).
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certainly possible that little should change in our current marriage regime.140 As
I noted at the start, my aim has not been to argue for one or another
countermarriage regime, but to excavate possibilities from some unlikely
sources. I thus conclude with a few reflections on these sources, and on the
relationships among law, literature, and innovation.
Various justifications may be offered for the status quo. For some
traditions and thinkers, the way things are is the way they should be—
“Whatever is, is right.”141 Burke famously extolled the virtues of tradition as
the accumulated wisdom of the centuries.142 More recently, there’s the joke
about the (old school) Chicago economist:
A Chicago economist and a friend were walking along the street when
they spotted a $20 bill. The economist kept walking. The friend turned
to him and asked, “Aren’t you going to pick that up?” “Of course not,”
said the economist. “It’s fake. If there were a real $20 bill on the
sidewalk, someone would have picked it up already.”143
The joke plays off classical economic principles, which suggest that the current
state of affairs cannot be improved upon, because the market has already
perfected it.144 The efficient markets hypothesis, for instance, posits that prices
accurately reflect all available information, and indeed instantly incorporate
any information that becomes newly available. Similarly, in the joke, money
could never be available for free.
The joke may be read as a fable about how certain assumptions about
economics can impoverish our sense of what is possible. The efficient markets
hypothesis and its ilk have of course been criticized from within economics,
and not just by behavioral economics.145 And various forms of economic
thinking have been the source of highly innovative and provocative ideas.146
But the pervasive use of certain concepts from economics, stripped of context
or crucial critique, may constrain our exploration of alternatives. For example,
the so-called Coase theorem, which is widely taught in law schools, has been
frequently mischaracterized as a theory of how legal rules might not matter to

140. It is possible, that is, that little should change other than who can participate, though I
do not present the case for that position here.
141. Alexander Pope, Essay on Man (1734) (ll. 293–94).
142. See, e.g., Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in The Portable
Edmund Burke 456 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1999).
143. See Laughter Soothes the Wounded Heart, No Joke: Animals Laugh, Too,
http://www.flatrock.org.nz/topics/humour/no_joke.htm (offering slightly different wording).
144. See also Aha Jokes, Economist Jokes, http://www.ahajokes.com/econ002.html (“Q:
How many Chicago School economists does it take to change a light bulb? A: None. If the light
bulb needed changing the market would have already done it.”).
145. See, e.g., Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960); see
also, e.g., Behavioral Law and Economics (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
146. For some family-law related examples, see, for example, Gary S. Becker, A
Treatise on the Family 81–104 (1991); Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. Legal Stud. 323 (1978).
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outcomes, even though Coase actually meant to highlight the importance of
transaction costs, not to posit their non-existence.147 Why the slippage exists is
an interesting question; there are apparently disciplinary and context-specific
reasons for it,148 but perhaps there is also something alluring about the idea that
things are as they should be, that private parties will work them out unaided by
law.149 Regardless, the slippage surrounding Coase is one example of how
watered-down principles of classical economics—at least in legal education—
may hinder legal thinkers’ appreciation of law’s imaginative possibilities, of
the potential benefits, as well as the costs, of innovation.
Research in fields ranging from social psychology (on system justification
and status quo bias) to organizational theory (for example, on the so-called dark
side of organizations) has documented the ways we become stuck in the present
configuration of things.150 What allows us to think beyond the ruts we create
for ourselves, to imagine and examine other possibilities?
In their different ways, both law and literature are realms of the
imagination, both mechanisms for innovation. Both urge us to expand our
thinking beyond the status quo. Literature is obviously a realm of the imagination. Scholars have already written about the political possibilities of the
literary imagination, for instance, in helping to facilitate empathy with diverse
others.151 But literature has been underutilized as a source of legal innovation.
147. See Coase, supra note 145; Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against
“Coaseanism”, 99 Yale L.J. 611, 614 (1989) (“In a retrospective essay in his recent book, Coase
writes: ‘The world of zero transaction costs has often been described as a Coasian world. Nothing
could be further from the truth. It is the world of modern economic theory, one which I was
hoping to persuade economists to leave.’”) (citing Ronald Coase, The Firm, the Market, and
the Law 174 (1988)); West, supra note 9, at 1190 (1996) (“Virtually all law students, for
example, at virtually all law schools, will receive, most likely in the very first semester of law
school, some exposure to the logic and impact of the Coase theorem . . . .”); cf. Michael R. Butler
& Robert F. Garnett, Teaching the Coase Theorem: Are We Getting It Right?, 31 Atlantic
Econ. J. 133 (2003) (concluding from a survey of microeconomic textbooks that these texts
frequently mischaracterize Coase in this way).
148. See, e.g., Butler & Garnett, supra note 147 (explaining the development of this
misapprehension).
149. Cf. John J. Donohue III, Commentary, Opting for the British Rule, or If Posner and
Shavell Can’t Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1093, 1115 (1991)
(“The human mind finds it far easier to make the best out of the current state of the world than it
does trying to conceive all of the ways in which the state of the world itself can be altered.”).
150. On the former, see Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and
Research: Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1119,
1119 (2006) (discussing, as the focus of System Justification Theory, “the motive to defend and
justify the social status quo, even among those who are seemingly most disadvantaged by it”);
Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227, 1228–29
(2003) (explaining “status quo bias” as the tendency of “individuals . . . to prefer the present state
of the world to alternative states, all other things being equal”); see also Martha Minow,
Making All the Difference (1991). On the latter, see Diane Vaughan, The Dark Side of
Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster, 25 Ann. Rev. Soc. 271 (1999); see also
Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 Duke L.J. 377, 417–20 (2006).
151. See, e.g., Martha Nussbaum, Narratives of Hierarchy: Loving v. Virginia and the
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Literature allows us to imagine entirely new regulatory worlds because
fictional worlds are also rule-bound. Literature, though it need not play by
reality’s rules, is not a free-for-all. Literary texts create fictional worlds with
internal rules that dictate what is possible within that world. It is for this reason
that we can say something is “unrealistic” or “would never happen” within a
work of, say, science fiction, whose frame is unrealistic; what we mean is that
the particular event violates the rules of that fictional world. The need for a nuanced rendering of a rule-bound universe—but where the usual nonfiction rules
need not apply—makes fiction a space for testing out regulatory possibilities.
Law seems a less likely candidate for an imaginative realm. And yet law
can force us out of the status quo as well. It can force us to change practices,
sometimes on the level of the minute details of our lives. Think of sexual
harassment law, which changed everyday workplace interactions in ways
inconceivable before its instantiation.152 Law can work against status quo bias;
for better or worse, it can force change into contexts that social pressures
cannot reach. In this way, law and literature have more in common than they
appear, as both invite innovation by spurring us to move beyond our
conventional choices into uncharted territory. Literature generally does this by
permission and imaginative license; law, in contrast, may do so by mandate.
None of these considerations show that things should change. Sometimes
the way things are is, indeed, the way things should be. But as Justice Holmes
famously wrote, “[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.”153 As scholars and students,
we should at least consider the range of alternatives to the present state of
things before reaching a conclusion about the normative merits or demerits of
keepings things as they are. In this possibly brief historical window of societal
rumination on the question whither marriage, we should look to whatever
sources we can find to open our minds to every imaginative possibility. We
should therefore look to both law and literature.

Literary Imagination, 17 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 337 (1997).
152. See, e.g., Directions in Sexual Harassment Law (Catharine A. MacKinnon &
Reva B. Siegel eds., 2003).
153. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897). Holmes
continued, “[i]t is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished
long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.” Id.

